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Highlights 
On the eve of the full entry into force of the UEFA Financial Fair Play 
Regulations (hereafter FFP regulations), the need to discuss the future 
(and the past) of European football regulation is pressing. 
A group of renowned scholars, UEFA officials, representatives of 
leagues, clubs player associations and civil society, met for a High-Lev-
el Policy Seminar, conveyed by the Global Governance Programme of 
the European University Institute, to discuss the future of European 
football governance and address three main questions: What is the ob-
jective of FFP regulations? Are the FFP regulations compatible with 
European Union Law? How can the FFP Regulations be improved or 
complemented? 
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Background 
At the beginning of the next football season the UEFA 
FFP regulations4 will be fully applicable. Football 
teams not in compliance with the regulation might 
face sanctions, up to the level of a full ban from the 
competitions organised by UEFA.5 Given that these 
competitions, especially the Champions League, 
are an important source of revenue for the partici-
pants, exclusion from them has similar effects as a 
substantial fine. Coupled with the licensing require-
ments introduced by UEFA, the accounting criteria 
defined in the FFP regulations are conceived as an 
economic hurdle for the clubs wanting to participate 
in the Champions League or the Europa league. The 
FFP regulations are not solely contested because of 
the financial costs they impose. Some clubs perceive 
the FFP regulations as an unlawful brake on their 
sporting development. 
The perspective of a legal challenge to the FFP regu-
lations, on the basis of national law or more likely 
of European law, makes it necessary to discuss in 
greater detail its purpose and its compatibility with 
EU law requirements. The urgency of this discussion 
is raised by the need to avoid a violent and destabi-
lising legal confrontation between EU law and the 
private regulation of sport, as already experienced 
4 See the UEFA Club licensing and Financial Fair Play regula-
tions 2012 (http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/
Tech/uefaorg/General/01/80/54/10/1805410_DOWNLOAD.
pdf) and the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Finan-
cial Control Body, 2012 (http://www.uefa.com/Multimedia-
Files/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/85/85/25/1858525_
DOWNLOAD.pdf)
5  For example the Malaga F.C. has been deprived of its right 
to play the UEFA Europa league next year, this decision was 
confirmed by Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), see (http://
www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/6820/5048/0/2013.06.11
20Communication20aux20medias20%28Fran%E7ais%29.pdf)
with the Bosman ruling of the European Court of 
Justice.6 The developments in European football 
governance since then have been largely guided by 
the intention to avoid any direct conflicts between 
the two sets of rules. 
In that sense, what makes the issue of the compat-
ibility of the FFP Regulations with EU law even 
more important is the fact that it constitutes the 
first comprehensive economic regulation of football 
put forward by UEFA since Bosman. Its entry into 
force and the questions that it raised deserved a spe-
cific encounter with both scholars and practitioners 
involved in the drafting and the implementation of 
such new piece of football regulation. 
Key Issues and Policy Recommendations
The FFP regulations are meant primarily to “curb 
the excesses and irrational gambling for success 
which have brought many clubs into difficulty.” In 
fact, all that UEFA wants “is for clubs – richer and 
poorer alike – to spend no more than they earn and 
to balance their books, this being the only sure way 
for them to survive.” More precisely, the FFP regu-
lations aim, according to article 2.2, to improve the 
economic and financial capability of clubs, protect 
creditors, ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with 
players, social/tax authorities and other clubs punc-
tually, introduce more discipline and rationality in 
club football finances, encourage clubs to operate on 
the basis of their own revenues, encourage respon-
sible spending for the long-term benefit of football 
6  Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football 
association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA 
v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations 
européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman (1995) 
ECR I-4921
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and protect the long-term viability and sustainability 
of European club football.
Hence, for its proponents, the FFP regulations have 
nothing to do with competitive balance, even if they 
don’t necessarily correlate negatively with it. Indeed, 
it is devised to put an end to the ’arms race’ raging 
amongst Europe’s wealthiest football clubs, which 
overwhelmingly support this regulation because 
they are tired of losing money. The objective is to 
deal with the threat of managerial moral hazard that, 
in the absence of hard budget constraints, may lead 
to an unsustainable salary bubble. For FFP’s pro-
ponents, it is the financial stability of the system as 
a whole that is at stake, and the FFP’s rules would 
allow for a healthy competition. All this is meant to 
ensure that, at some point, teams meet with equals 
on the sporting field. Another way to put it, to avoid 
referring directly to the issue of competitive balance, 
would be to consider that the objective of the FFP 
regulations is to promote good corporate govern-
ance in order to build a sustainable market. Hence, 
this regulation could lead to a more balanced and 
efficient form of competition – even though com-
petitive balance has not been put forth as its explicit 
aim. 
However, some questions remain open for debate: 
is the insolvency of a single football club a real 
economic problem susceptible to “have negative 
external effects or even exhibit systemic risks”? Why 
are the usual insolvency and corporate laws inad-
equate to fulfil the objective of financial stability? 
Is this another case where sport claims to be special 
and explicitly rejects legal scrutiny?
The Compatibility of FFP regulations with 
EU law
The fact that the FFP regulations produce nega-
tive externalities, especially but not exclusively for 
workers and consumers, exposes it to the scrutiny 
of EU law, primarily under competition law, but 
potentially also under the rules on free movement 
of workers. Indeed, several participants of the High-
Level Policy Seminar have raised the possibility of 
such a challenge due to the horizontal and vertical 
restraints of competition law that the FFP regulations 
would entail. This might become relevant before the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (and, later on, before 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal), which would be compe-
tent to review cases involving the FFP regulations. 
The UEFA has claimed that it is working hand in 
hand with the European Commission concerning 
the FFP regulations. However, we all know, since the 
Bosman case at the latest, that such cooperation is 
no bulletproof guarantee against the FFP regulations 
breaching EU law. Maybe there won’t be anybody to 
challenge the FFP regulations, as the various foot-
ball stakeholders seem to have approved them and 
the European Commission favours them. There is 
nevertheless a need to assess thoroughly the compat-
ibility of the FFP regulations with EU law. Assuming 
that no general exemption from EU law for sporting 
regulation would be available, and that in the light 
of the previous discussion FFP regulations are likely 
to constitute a restriction on the free movement of 
sportsmen (through the ‘fake salary cap’ it creates) as 
well as a restriction of competition, the main ques-
tion is that of their justifiability. Apart from the rela-
tively narrow justifications provided by Art 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), a regulation having restrictive effects 
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on competition could be justifiable only if those are 
inherent to the legitimate objectives pursued and do 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. 
 A. Legitimate Objective
As we have seen previously, the FFP regulations 
are not explicitly aimed at maintaining competitive 
balance. In fact, they could even have the effect of 
worsening competitive balance by raising barriers to 
entry for new competitors. Therefore, UEFA will not 
be able to rely on such an objective to justify the FFP 
regulations in light of EU competition law or free 
movement challenges. Hence, the key question is 
“whether the Court will accept the actual aim of the 
rules - to achieve and maintain long-term financial 
viability and continued competition - as legitimate.” 
It has been argued that addressing the problem of 
over -indebtedness of clubs, in the context of sports, 
may be a legitimate argument in itself. The prospect 
of bankruptcy for famous football clubs, for reasons 
of culture as well as on competitive grounds, may be 
something that sports regulators could legitimately 
seek to avoid. 
If the objective of the FFP regulations is to impose 
good corporate governance, this might easily be 
recognised by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union as a legitimate objective. However, there is 
a need to clarify precisely what kind of poor man-
agement those regulations are supposed to tackle. 
Moreover, the stated objective has to be in accord-
ance with the actual implementation of the FFP reg-
ulations.
B. Suitability and Necessity
There is scepticism regarding the means necessary 
to conduct a detailed assessment of the accounting 
practices of more than 600 European clubs each year. 
Indeed, the evaluation of the fair value of a sponsor 
deal or of a specific asset in each particular case 
reaching the UEFA Club Financial Control Body 
(CFCB) will prove highly problematic and contex-
tual. The evaluation of the efficiency of an invest-
ment might prove to be very difficult. The system 
might turn out to be a gigantic ‘usine à gaz’, a very 
costly institutional set-up that is not at all certain to 
be able to rein the practices it is supposed to super-
vise. Even if the goal of financial stability or sustain-
ability is desirable as such, actually implementing 
the FFP regulations might become a bureaucratic 
nightmare, not really worth the trouble for all the 
involved parties. 
Furthermore, to be justified under EU law a restric-
tion must be necessary, meaning that no less restric-
tive alternative is available to attain the legitimate 
objective at stake. At this stage, many alternatives 
could come into play. A true salary cap might be a 
better solution to achieve both financial stability and 
competitive balance. Moreover, it would also imply 
a more inclusive approach toward the affected third-
parties, especially the players through their repre-
sentatives. Other alternatives, ranging from a ban 
on cash trade to revenue sharing could also be pro-
posed. On the other hand, in light of the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and its limited recognition 
of the specificity of sport, it may be argued that the 
appreciation of the best available means should be 
left to the sporting margin of appreciation of UEFA. 
This implies, however, that a UEFA regulation pro-
vides for a transparent legal process and determinate 
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legal sanctions. The lack of precise sanctions for spe-
cific contraventions of the FFP regulations opens up 
the field for speculation about the arbitrariness of 
the enforcement process.
Beyond the FFP Regulations: Policy Rec-
ommendations
It is regrettable that the FFP regulations’ link with 
the issue of competitive balance remains unclear. 
Indeed, the FFP regulations may not result in vibrant 
and competitive football leagues. In fact, a compara-
tive analysis with the US tends to indicate that gov-
erning bodies of football should devise institutional 
mechanisms capable of reducing the inequality 
amongst the various European clubs, if football’s 
attractiveness is to be sustainable in the long run. 
This lacuna of the FFP regulations could be addressed 
via various solidarity enhancing mechanisms, or via 
a more stringent salary cap – which could, how-
ever, also lead to serious questions of compatibility 
with EU law. Some of these innovations might draw 
inspiration from the American model of profes-
sional sport; however, we have to be conscious that 
this model cannot be transposed literally in Europe. 
Some features of European football – the promotion 
and relegation system being the most notable – are 
deeply-rooted and should not be modified. A new 
model of European football governance, guaran-
teeing also a wider inclusiveness of stakeholders – 
sportsmen, consumers or local authorities – needs to 
be developed autonomously by the European foot-
ball family.
Finally, concerning the FFP regulations as such, it is 
important for the legitimacy of the enforcement pro-
cess that precise sanctions , especially linked with the 
nature of the infringement, are put in place. There is 
a need to enhance legal certainty and to reduce the 
arbitrariness of a decision adopted by the UEFA Club 
Financial Control Body. Otherwise, there would be 
a risk that the extent of the sanction is perceived as 
depending on extra-legal factors (popularity, eco-
nomic power etc.). This could undermine the legiti-
macy of the process in the eyes of the parties, in turn 
raising the risk of legal challenges before national or 
European Courts. 
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